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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
FREDERICK THOMAS GEORGE, : Case No. 20060591-CA 
Defendant/Petitioner. : Appellant is not incarcerated. 
INTRODUCTION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's order and instead hold the admission of 
the breath test affidavits would violate the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, as 
defined in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and Davis v. Washington, 126 
S.Ct. 2266 (2006). Moreover, this Court should decline to reach the City's proposed 
issue of whether the breath test affidavits are self-authenticating documents because this 
issue is not properly before this Court, is not a proper alternative ground for affirmance, 
is inadequately briefed, and is immaterial since the breath test affidavits are inadmissible 
under the Sixth Amendment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE BREATH TEST AFFIDAVITS IMPLICATE THE SIXTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION BECAUSE THEY ARE 
TESTIMONIAL IN NATURE 
The breath test affidavits at issue in this case are testimonial evidence. As 
illustrated by the City, some jurisdictions have held breath test affidavits are not 
testimonial. Appellee Br. at 9. The better-reasoned decisions, however, have applied the 
definition of testimonial evidence outlined in Crawford and Davis, as George asks this 
Court to do, and held breath test affidavits that are prepared for use against accused 
persons in criminal prosecutions are testimonial in nature and subject to confrontation. 
See infra at Part A; Appellant's Brief at 14-16. 
Specifically, evidence can be testimonial even though it is not accusatory in nature 
or intended to prosecute a particular defendant. See infra at Part B. Regardless, the 
breath test affidavits at issue in this case are accusatory and not merely administrative 
documents. See id. Further, the opportunity to cross-examine the trooper who calibrates 
the Intoxilyzer machine has utility because certain aspects of the calibration process are 
left to the discretion of the technician. See infra at Part C. Finally, the primary purpose 
of the breath test affidavits is not to assist police in an ongoing emergency, but to assist 
prosecutors in proving that a person committed a crime. See infra at Part D. 
A. This Court Should Follow the Jurisdictions that, Applying Crawford and 
Davis, Have Held Breath Test Affidavits Prepared For Use Against Accused 
Persons in Criminal Prosecutions Are Testimonial in Nature. 
Courts have held that breath test affidavits similar to those in this case are 
testimonial in nature. See e ^ , Shiver v. State, 900 So.2d 615 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); 
People v. Orpin, 796 N.Y.S.2d 512, 516-17 (N.Y. Just. Ct. 2005) (holding certifications 
are testimonial because they are prepared only for use in DUI cases and technicians must 
have known reports would be used in criminal prosecutions), disagreed with by Green v. 
DeMarco, 812 N.Y.S.2d 772 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005). 
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Specifically, Shiver's holding is directly applicable to this case. There, the breath 
test affidavit contained the results of the defendant's breath test as well as the 
maintenance results. See Shiver, 900 So.2d at 617; Appellee's Brief at 22-23; 
Appellant's Brief 15-16. The trooper who performed the breath test testified at trial, 
however, the technician who calibrated the machine did not. Shiver, 900 So.2d at 617. 
Consequently, the confrontation issue on appeal there, like the issue on appeal here, dealt 
specifically with admission of the calibration results. Id at 617-18. Looking to 
Crawford, the appellate court held this portion of the breath test affidavit was testimonial 
hearsay because it "contained statements one would reasonably expect to be used 
prosecutorially, and was made under circumstances which would lead an objective 
witness to reasonably believe the statements would be available for trial." Id. at 618. 
"Specifically, the affidavit" contained "crucial" testimonial evidence "regarding when the 
statutorily required maintenance of the instrument was performed." IdL Thus, "[b]ecause 
[defendant] was unable to challenge the accuracy of the instrument by the constitutionally 
mandated method of cross-examination of the person who performed the maintenance, 
introduction of the affidavit violated [defendant's] right to confront witnesses." IdL 
Other courts have issued decisions that are instructive in this case because they 
deal with documents comparable to breath test affidavits. See e.g., Martin v. State, 936 
So.2d 1190, 1192 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (citation omitted) (holding lab report 
indicating substances seized were contraband was testimonial because it was prepared by 
an officer, "'contained statements one would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially 
and was made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness to reasonably 
3 
believe the statements would be available for trial5") (further citation omitted); Belvin v. 
State, 922 So.2d 1046, 1052-52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (declining to reach the issue of 
whether "portions of the breath test affidavit pertaining to the maintenance and inspection 
of the breath test instrument violate[d] the Confrontation Clause," but citing Shiver 
favorably and holding "portions of the breath test affidavit pertaining to the breath test 
technician's procedures and observations in administering the breath test constitute 
testimonial evidence"). 
The above cases "represent a more faithful application of Crawford" than the cases 
cited by the City. Orpin, 796 N.Y.S.2d at 517; see Appellee's Brief at 9. They recognize 
that "what matters under the Crawford analysis is that the declarant knows that the 
statement will be used in a prosecution. Once this test is satisfied, the Confrontation 
Clause is implicated, and the defendant is constitutionally entitled to cross examine the 
declarant." Orpin, 796 N.Y.S.2d at 517. Conversely, the cases cited by the City put their 
"emphasis on the routine and nonadversarial nature of the [calibration] test," which "are 
the very type of substantive reliability concerns rejected by Crawford." Id.; see 
Appellee's Brief at 9. In other words, they ignore the holdings of Crawford and Davis 
"that the Confrontation Clause's guarantee is procedural—entitling the defendant to cross 
examination—rather than substantive in nature." Orpin, 796 N.Y.S.2d at 517. 
Moreover, some of the cases cited by the City are distinguishable because, unlike 
this case, they address certification documents that are not specifically identified as 
affidavits. See Jarrell v. State, 852 N.E.2d 1022, 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (finding 
breath test machine certificates to be nontestimonial and specifically noting that they 
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"they are not sworn affidavits and do not contain formalized testimonial materials"). 
Unlike certificates, affidavits are "voluntary declaration[s] of facts written down and 
sworn to by the declarant[.]" Black's Law Dictionary 62 (8th ed. 2004). In fact, 
Crawford specifically identified affidavits as evidence that falls within the "core class" of 
testimonial evidence. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 51 ("Various formulations of this core 
class of "testimonial" statements exist: 'ex parte in-court testimony or its functional 
equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits[.]'") (emphasis in the original). In this 
case, the calibration results were prepared in the form of sworn affidavits and specifically 
intended for use at trial. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a~515 (Supp. 2006). As such, they 
fall within the core class of testimonial evidence described in Crawford. 
B. Although Evidence Need Not Be Accusatory to Be Testimonial, the Breath Test 
Affidavits In This Case Are Accusatory and Not Merely Administrative. 
Evidence does not have to be accusatory or aimed toward prosecuting a particular 
defendant in order to be testimonial in nature. Testimonial evidence is defined as "[a] 
person's testimony offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Black's Law 
Dictionary 600 (8th ed. 2004). Nowhere in this definition is testimonial evidence 
described as accusatory in nature. Moreover: 
"Nothing in Crawford declares that the hearsay statement must 'accuse [the 
defendant] of any wrongdoing' to be testimonial or that 'statements ... neutral in 
character' are nontestimonial. Indeed, nothing within the meaning of 
'testimonial' equates with 'accusatory.' Furthermore, it is a dubious conclusion 
that the prosecutor's evidence could ever be 'neutral' in the context of the 
adversarial system in a criminal proceeding. 'The Framers would be astounded 
to learn that ex parte testimony could be admitted against a criminal defendant 
because it was elicited by 'neutral' government officers.'" 
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Luginbvhl v. Commonwealth, 618 S.E.2d 347? 359 (Va. Ct. App. 2005) (Benton, J., 
dissenting) (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 66) (omissions and alterations in the original). 
Additionally, the fact that the affidavits are not prepared for use in a particular 
case against a particular defendant is irrelevant. As previously discussed, the relevant 
consideration is whether the affidavit was "'made under circumstances which would lead 
an objective witness reasonably to believe that [it] would be available for use at a later 
trial.5" Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (citation omitted); see supra at Part LA. For example, 
in City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, 124 P.3d 203 (Nev. 2005), the Nevada Supreme Court 
considered the admissibility "of a nurse's affidavit to prove certain facts relating to the 
withdrawal of blood for testing purposes." Walsh, 124 P.3d at 204. The court 
determined the affidavits were testimonial evidence because "[ajlthough they may 
document standard procedures, they are made for use at a later trial or legal proceeding." 
IdL at 208; see People v. Lonsby, 707 N.W.2d 610, 619-20 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) 
(holding non-testifying serologist's notes and lab report constituted testimonial hearsay 
that the scientist could "reasonably expect would be used in a prosecutorial manner and 
at trial," in part because these "written analyses are regularly prepared for and introduced 
in court"). 
Likewise, it does not matter that the technicians who calibrate the machines are 
not conducting investigations or engaged in policing activities. See Appellee's Brief at 
15-16. "The Confrontation Clause in no way governs police conduct, because it is the 
trial use of, not the investigatory collection of, ex parte testimonial statements which 
offends that provision." Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2279 n.6 (emphasis in the original). Besides, 
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even if this were a relevant consideration, the technicians are government officers and, as 
Utah Highway Patrol troopers, are closely affiliated with law enforcement. As such, they 
are "agents of law enforcement" under Davis. Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2274 n.2. Moreover, 
their role in calibrating the Intoxilyzer machine and certifying as to results that are 
regularly used in DUI prosecutions "readily places them within the ambit of the 
'testimonial' boundaries of Crawford." State v. Kent, 918 A.2d 626, 638 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2007). 
For example, the defendant in Kent challenged the admission of a "laboratory 
report prepared by a State Police chemist and a blood test certificate prepared . . . by a 
hospital employee." Kent, 918 A.2d at 628. Recognizing "hospital nurses, phlebotomists 
and other medical personnel are not police officers," the appellate court nonetheless 
concluded "their close interaction with law enforcement officers, in extracting blood from 
DWI suspects and in certifying as to 'the manner and circumstances under which the 
sample was taken,' readily places them within the ambit of the 'testimonial' boundaries 
of Crawford." Id. at 638 (citing legislative purpose behind the blood sampling statute); 
see Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2274 n.2 (noting that "[i]f 911 operators are not themselves law 
enforcement officers, they may at least be agents of law enforcement. . . [and] we 
consider their acts to be acts of the police"). 
Finally, although the breath test affidavits in this case "may document standard 
procedures" (Walsh, 124 P.3d at 208), they are specifically intended for use at a future 
DUI prosecution and are regularly prepared for and introduced in court. Notably, there is 
no reason why the calibration test results would need to be prepared in the form of an 
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affidavit unless the results are intended for use at a future trial. See Shiver, 900 So.2d at 
618 (holding breath test affidavit was testimonial evidence because "[i]t contained 
statements one would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially, and was made under 
circumstances which would lead an objective witness to reasonably believe the 
statements would be available for trial. In fact, the only reason the affidavit was 
prepared was for admission at trial") (emphasis added)). Therefore, because the 
calibration test results are prepared in the form of a sworn affidavit and specifically 
intended for use at a future trial, the evidence is testimonial in nature under Crawford. 
C. The Opportunity to Cross-Examine the Trooper Who Calibrates the 
Intoxilyzer Machine Has Utility Because Aspects of the Calibration Process 
Are Left to the Discretion of the Technician. 
There is utility to cross-examination of the technician who performed the 
calibration tests regardless of whether the tests are routinely performed or considered 
mechanical in nature. See Appellant's Brief at 16-21. For example, in Kent, the court 
did not consider the lab report and blood sample certificate to be "non-testimonial simply 
because they were technical in nature or because they were prepared in the ordinary 
course of a DWI investigation." Kent, 918 A.2d at 640. Acknowledging that "the 
information on those records is technical in many, but not all, respects," the appellate 
court nonetheless could not conclude that "their certified contents are beyond the scope 
of testimonial assertions that a defendant is entitled to test through cross-examination in a 
courtroom." Id.; see Lonsby, 707 N.W.2d at 620 (noting admission of unavailable 
witness's lab report and notes violated Confrontation Clause because "defendant was 
unable, through the crucible of cross-examination, to challenge the objectivity of [the 
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scientist] and the accuracy of her observations and methodology . . . [and] could not 
question or attack [the scientist's] preliminary test results or the soundness of her 
judgment in failing to conduct additional tests."). 
Contrary to the City's assertions, there is utility to cross-examination of the Utah 
Highway Patrol trooper because certain aspects of the calibration procedure are left to the 
discretion of the technician. According to the established calibration procedure, the 
technician tests the Intoxilyzer machine using a control sample solution with a known 
alcohol content. The technician decides the number of tests to run. Additionally, the 
sample, which is meant to simulate a human breath sample, must be warmed up so as to 
be consistent with human body temperature. The technician can run one or more samples 
during this "warming up" stage without recording results. Most importantly, the 
technician can reject any tests that are run, without recording that the test was run or the 
basis for the rejection. Hence, technicians have complete discretion to run numerous 
samples, discretion to record or omit any sample, and discretion to choose to reject results 
either because the technician believes the inconsistent results were obtained because the 
machine and sample were warming up or for whatever reason the technician believes is 
important. Accordingly, cross-examination in this area, as well as in the areas outlined in 
Appellant's Brief at 18-21, is necessary. 
In other words, while the calibration process itself may be technical or mechanical 
in nature and performed on a routine basis, certain aspects of the testing procedure are 
left to the discretion and judgment of the technician. Therefore, George should have the 
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opportunity to question the technician's methodology and judgment in administering the 
tests. 
D. The Primary Purpose of the Breath Test Affidavits Is to Assist Prosecutors In 
Proving that a Person Committed a Crime. 
As explained in George's opening brief, the primary purpose test considers 
whether the statement was made for "the primary purpose of. . . enabling] police 
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency," or for the "primary purpose" of 
"establishing] or prov[ing] past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution." 
Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2273-74. In other words, when there is no ongoing emergency and 
the primary purpose of the statement is to establish that a person committed a crime, the 
hearsay is testimonial. Id. In this case, the breath test affidavit is testimonial under the 
primary purpose test because there was no ongoing emergency at the time it was prepared 
and it was prepared by a law enforcement officer for the primary purpose of serving as 
evidence against future defendants. 
First, the breath test affidavit does not lose its testimonial nature simply because it 
can be used as evidence in both criminal prosecutions and driver license suspension 
hearings. In both the criminal prosecution and the suspension hearing, the affidavit 
serves as an "obvious substitute for live testimony." Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2278. It is 
offered in place of the witness to "do precisely" what the witness would have done "on 
direct examination." Id. In other words, its primary purpose in both cases is to give 
testimony that "provefs] past events potentially relevant" to the City's case. Id. at 2273-
74; see Belvin, 922 So.2d at 1050 (holding breath test affidavits "qualify as 'statements 
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that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to 
believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial" because they are 
"generated by law enforcement for use at a later criminal trial or driver's license 
revocation proceeding") (citation omitted); Kent, 918 A.2d at 637 (finding lab report and 
blood sample certification were testimonial evidence and noting "the 'primary purpose' 
of the blood certificate was surely to preserve evidence for a future anticipated DWI 
prosecution"). 
Second, a statement does not lose its testimonial nature if it does not specifically 
refer to the "events of a past crime." Appellee's Brief at 20-21. Rather, as acknowledged 
by the City, evidence is testimonial if it refers to "facts of a past crime" that "identify (or 
provide evidence to convict) the perpetrator." Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2276. In other words, 
a statement is testimonial if its primary purpose is to prove any "past events potentially 
relevant to later criminal prosecution." Id. at 2274. In this case, the purpose of the breath 
test affidavit is to prove that the Intoxilyzer machine was calibrated and working properly 
on or around the time it was used for a particular defendant. Thus, these affidavits are 
potentially relevant to future criminal prosecutions because they are regularly used at trial 
to establish the integrity or reliability of the Intoxilyzer machine in order to provide 
foundational evidence for the admission of breath test results in a particular case. 
Third, "the absence of any interrogation" does not "imply" that evidence is 
"necessarily nontestimonial." Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2274 n.l; see Appellee's Brief at 19-
20. "The Framers were no more willing to exempt from cross-examination volunteered 
testimony or answers to open-ended questions than they were to exempt answers to 
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detailed interrogation." Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2274 n.l (citation omitted). Rather, the 
testimonial nature of evidence is determined by evaluating "the declarant's statements, 
not the interrogator's questions." Id. In this case, the breath test affidavit is testimonial 
even though it is not the product of an interrogation because the primary purpose of the 
declarant's statements was to give testimony that "prove[s] past events potentially 
relevant" to the City's prosecution of a defendant. Id. at 2273-74. Thus, the breath test 
affidavit qualifies as testimonial evidence under the primary purpose test. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT ADDRESS THE CITY'S PROPOSED ISSUE 
OF WHETHER THE INTOXILYZER AFFIDAVITS ARE SELF-
AUTHENTICATING DOCUMENTS 
Although it acknowledges that neither the trial court nor this Court "need to reach 
traditional hearsay exceptions," the City asks this Court to hold breath test affidavits "are 
self-authenticating documents whose foundational threshold for admissibility is 
equivalent to that of public record, i.e., without foundational testimony." Appellee's 
Brief at 33. This Court should decline to reach this issue because it was not certified for 
interlocutory appeal, it is an alternative ground for affirmance that is not apparent on the 
record or supported by factual findings of the trial court, and it is inadequately briefed. 
Besides, in this case, it does not matter whether the breath test affidavits qualify under the 
public or business records hearsay exceptions because they are still testimonial evidence 
offered in violation of the Sixth Amendment. 
First, "[o]n interlocutory appeal, [appellate courts] review only those specific 
issues presented in the petition." Houghton v. Dept. of Health, 2005 UT 63,TJ16, 125 
P.3d 860; see State v. Lusk, 2001 UT 102,^ f32, 37 P.3d 1103 (refusing to decide an issue 
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"beyond the scope of review for which [the court] granted [defendant's] petition for this 
interlocutory appeal"). In this case, the question of whether breath test affidavits are self-
authenticating documents is a separate issue that was not certified for interlocutory 
review. See Appellant's Brief at 1-2; R. 94. Accordingly, this Court should not address 
the issue because it would unnecessarily complicate and lengthen the appellate process, 
thereby defeating the purpose of the interlocutory appeal. See Manwill v. Oyler, 361 
P.2d 177, 178 (Utah 1961) (holding purpose of interlocutory appeal "is to get directly at 
and dispose of the issues as quickly as possible consistent with thoroughness and 
efficiency in the administration of justice"); Utah R. App. P. 5(e). 
Second, "an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from 'if it is 
sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record.5" State v. Topanotes, 
2003 UT 30,1(9, 76 P.3d 1159 (citing Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58,1fl0, 52 P.3d 1158); 
see State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 149 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). "'[Apparent on the 
record' . . . means more than mere assumption or absence of evidence contrary to the 
'new5 ground or theory." Montoya, 937 P.2d at 149-50. Rather, "[t]he record must 
contain sufficient and uncontroverted evidence supporting the ground or theory to place a 
person of ordinary intelligence on notice that the prevailing party may rely thereon on 
appeal." Id The alternative ground "must also be sustainable by the factual findings of 
the trial court." Topanotes, 2003 UT 30 at 1}9. In this case, the City did not argue below 
that breath test affidavits are self-authenticating documents and the trial judge did not 
enter any factual findings relevant to this issue. See R. 84-90; 106. Thus, this Court 
should not consider this issue as an alternative ground for affirmance. 
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Third, appellate parties bear "the burden of thoroughly briefing an issue." 
Montoya, 937 P.2d at 150. An appellate brief must "contain the contentions and reasons 
of the [party] with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing 
any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and 
parts of the record relied on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); see Montoya, 937 P.2d at 150 
(holding rule 24(a)(9) "is applicable to an appellee through Rule 24(b)"). If a party does 
not adequately brief an issue, then the appellate court "will decline to address the issue 
because the 'reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent 
authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the 
burden of argument and research.'" Montoya, 937 P.2d at 150 (citation omitted); see 
State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (declining to reach issue because 
"brief contained] no authority and provide[d] no meaningful analysis" to support the 
argument); State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) (same). 
The City's briefing of this issue relies heavily on assumption to reach its desired 
conclusion. Specifically, the City assumes that breath test affidavits qualify under a 
hearsay exception and that the only question left is "under what exception are they 
admitted?" Appellee's Brief at 28. It assumes, without citing Utah rules or analyzing 
Utah cases, that breath test affidavits qualify under Utah's business or public records 
hearsay exceptions because other jurisdictions have reached such conclusions. 
Appellee's Brief at 28. Relying on Crawford, the City assumes public records are 
nontestimonial, even though Crawford never said as much. See Appellee's Brief at 29 
(citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 36, 56 ("Most of the hearsay exceptions covered statements 
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that by their nature were non-testimonial—for example, business records . . .")). Despite 
our supreme court's holding in Murray City v. Hall 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983), that 
section 41-6a-515 did not violate the Confrontation Clause because the defendant, if he 
chose, could subpoena the officer to testify at trial, the City assumes breath test affidavits 
are self-authenticating because other jurisdictions have said so. See Hall 663 P.2d at 
1322; cf. Appellee's Brief at 30-31.1 Building on these assumptions, the City concludes, 
without analysis, that breath test affidavits fall under a statutory hearsay exception that 
"parallels]" the public records exception (as opposed to the business records exception) 
As explained in George's opening brief, Hall was decided before Crawford. 
Consequently, Hall's use of the pre-Crawford reliability test to determine whether the 
evidence violated the Confrontation Clause is not helpful in this case. See Hall 663 P.2d 
at 1319-21; Appellant's Brief at 8-9. Its recognition, however, that the defendant may 
subpoena the trooper to testify at trial if he wishes to question him, remains good law. 
See Hall 663 P.2d at 1322; Appellant's Brief at 8-9. 
Regardless, the City asks this Court to overrule Hall. See Appellee's Brief at 36-
38. For support, the City cites case law and legislative history addressing general 
scientific reliability. See Appellee's Brief at 35-38. In this case, however, George does 
not challenge the scientific reliability of "breath testing technology." Appellee's Brief at 
38. Rather, he argues that he should have the opportunity to cross-examine the trooper 
who operated the calibration machine in order to make sure the trooper is credible, 
operated the machine correctly, and conducted the testing in a manner that ensured the 
reliability of the results. 
The City also argues that upholding Hall would create inefficiency. See 
Appellee's Brief at 31-33. Hall which has been followed in Utah trial courts for twenty-
four years, does not require the trooper to be subpoenaed in every case. Rather, it simply 
allows the trooper to be subpoenaed on a case-by-case basis, depending on whether the 
defendant believes there is a question about the affidavit that warrants cross-examination. 
See Hall 663 P.2d at 1322. Besides, the City's concerns about efficiency cannot override 
the constitutional right to confrontation. See State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1314 
(Utah 1987) (holding "constitutional rights may not be sacrificed in the name of judicial 
economy"); Orem City v. Bergstrom, 1999 UT App 350,^15, 992 P.2d 991 (same). 
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and, therefore, are "admissible without foundation testimony." 2 Appellee's Brief at 29-
30. 
Besides, in this case, it does not matter whether the breath test affidavits qualify 
under the public or business records hearsay exceptions because they were prepared by a 
law enforcement officer in anticipation of prosecution, and are still testimonial evidence 
offered in violation of the Sixth Amendment. See supra at Part I. 
As explained by the California appellate court in People v. Mitchell 32 
Cal.Rptr.3d 613 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005), "[classification as a 'business record' . . . does not 
alone determine whether this type of evidence is admissible as non-testimonial under 
Crawford." Mitchell, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d at 621. Rather, "the questions before a court are 
more properly whether the business record in question nevertheless contains testimonial 
evidence." Id; see State v. Crager, 844 N.E.2d 390, 397 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) ("[W]hile 
some evidence may fall within the general business-records exception, other business 
records should nonetheless be subject to a Crawford analysis and be excluded from 
evidence thereunder because they are in fact testimonial."). 
The City's argument is also contrary to its previous contention that the business records 
hearsay exception applied to breath test affidavits. See R. 106:9. This change raises 
questions of preservation and invited error. See Montoya, 937 P.2d at 150 (holding "[a] 
well-briefed argument is most essential for an issue raised by an appellee for the first 
time on appeal because the new issue has not been addressed by the parties below"); 
State v. Holgate, 200 UT 74,Tfl 1, 10 P.3d 346 ("As a general rule, claims not raised 
before the trial court may not be raised on appeal, (citation omitted)); Pratt v. Nelson, 
2007 UT 41,^17, — P.3d — ("Our invited error doctrine arises from the principle that a 
party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial 
court into committing the error." (citation omitted)). It also implicates the doctrine 
surrounding proposed alternative grounds for affirmance. See Topanotes, 2003 UT 30 at 
TJ9 (holding alternative ground for affirmance must be "'apparent on the record'" and 
"sustainable by the factual findings of the trial court"). 
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In order to determine whether a business record is admissible under Crawford, 
"courts have generally looked to the purpose for which a document was produced." 
Mitchell, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d at 621. Specifically, "[i]f a record was produced 'with an eye 
toward trial5 or specifically for use in a criminal prosecution,. . . courts have generally 
found the record testimonial." Id. (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.7); see Crager, 844 
N.E.2d at 397 (finding that although lab and DNA reports "are generally prepared and 
kept in the course of a regularly conducted business," they are testimonial because they 
"are prepared wholly in anticipation of litigation."); Lonsby, 707 N.W.2d at 618 n.7 
(noting "trustworthiness of the evidence 'is undermined when [public or business] 
records are prepared in anticipation of litigation'") (citation omitted); City of Chicago v. 
Old Colony Partners, L.P., 847 N.E.2d 565, 576 (111. App. Ct. 2006) (noting "business 
records made in anticipation of litigation do not possess the same trustworthiness of other 
records prepared in the ordinary course of business"); United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 
227, 234 (2d. Cir. 2006) (recognizing that "because Rule 803(6) requires business records 
to be kept in the regular course of a business activity, records created in anticipation of 
litigation do not fall within its definition"); Rhone v. State, 825 N.E.2d 1277, 1284 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2005) (discussing public records exception and noting that "[i]f the report or 
record was prepared for advocacy purposes or in anticipation of litigation, then it is 
inadmissible hearsay"). 
As explained in Crawford, "[i] nvolvement of government officers in the 
production of testimony with an eye toward trial presents unique potential for 
prosecutorial abuse. . . . This consideration does not evaporate when testimony happens 
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to fall within some broad, modern hearsay exception, even if that exception might be 
justifiable in other circumstances." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.7. 
Although the Intoxilyzer machines are routinely calibrated, the affidavits are 
prepared primarily for prosecution rather than administrative purposes. "[S]uch utility as 
[the calibration test results] possess," however, "relates primarily to prosecution of 
suspected law breakers, and only incidentally to the systematic conduct of the police 
business." State v. Bertul 664 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Utah 1983); see People v. Hernandez, 
794 N.Y.S.2d 788, 789 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) (finding latent fingerprint report was 
testimonial evidence because "[t]he fingerprints in question were not taken simply for 
administrative use," but "with the ultimate goal of apprehending and successfully 
prosecuting a defendant"). Moreover, breath test affidavits are prepared with the 
involvement of government officers—Utah Highway Patrol troopers—and are primarily 
intended to serve as evidence in future court proceedings. See supra at I; Appellee's 
Brief at 19 (agreeing primary purpose of breath test affidavits is to serve as evidence in 
criminal prosecutions and driver license suspension hearings). 
Thus, this Court need not address whether breath test affidavit qualifies under 
either the public or business records hearsay exceptions because, regardless of its 
qualification under a hearsay exception, it is still testimonial evidence that is inadmissible 
under Crawford since the affiant is unavailable and George has not had a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination. 
18 
CONCLUSION 
George respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's order and 
instead, hold that admission of the breath test affidavits would violate the Sixth 
Amendment right to confrontation. 
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